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The English courts’ position on compensation for the costs of raising “unwanted” children 
has remained static for 15 years, despite being widely criticised. ARB v IVF Hammersmith 
and R [2018] EWCA Civ 2803; [2019] 2 W.L.R. 1094 provided a welcome opportunity to 
review this controversial area of law. However, rather than using the contractual dimension 
of that case to strike out from the law’s approach to negligence claims, the Court of Appeal 
transposed it uncritically into contract law, affirming that whether a wrongful conception 
claim is brought in negligence or for breach of contract, the costs of raising the child are not 
recoverable. Regrettably, the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal, since it raised no 
point of law that demanded consideration at present. However it did not deny that the points 
of law raised were arguable or of general public importance.  
    In 2008, the claimant (ARB) and his partner (R) underwent fertility treatment at the 
defendant clinic, IVF Hammersmith, resulting in the birth of their first child. As part thereof, 
both parties consented to the freezing of further embryos, and signed agreements annually to 
store them. On 5 March 2010, the couple returned to the clinic for advice on further 
treatment. R then returned for further appointments without ARB in April, May and October 
2010, at some point being given a “Consent to Thawing of Embryos” form requiring the 
signature of both parties. Unbeknown to the clinic, during this time, the relationship broke 
down and by July 2010 the couple had separated. Some time later, R returned the form, dated 
20 October 2010 and purportedly signed by both herself and ARB. Accordingly, an embryo 
was implanted in R’s womb, resulting in the birth of a second child, E. On the evidence, Jay 
J. [2017] EWHC 2438 (QB); [2018] 2 W.L.R. 1223 found that the signature had been forged, 
and that ARB would not have consented to the thawing and use of frozen embryos. 
Accordingly, ARB argued that the clinic had breached an express or implied term of its 
contract that it would secure his signed written consent to the thawing and implantation of 
embryos. Alternatively, it had breached an express or implied term to take reasonable care in 
obtaining such consent. He sought seven-figure damages for the costs of her upbringing, 
including “private education, a gap year, university abroad, [and] a generous wedding” (see 
at [325]). The clinic sued R for the tort of deceit, seeking an indemnity under CPR Pt 20.  
 
    Both Jay J. and the Court of Appeal approached the situation first as a matter of contractual 
interpretation. The crucial document was the “Agreement for Cryopreservation of Embryos” 
which ARB and R had signed before undergoing their original fertility treatment. Clause 1(a) 
stated that ARB and R “understand” that they “must both give written consent before any 
embryos are thawed and replaced”. Jay J. held that this imposed a strict duty on the clinic not 
to thaw or replace an embryo without written consent of both parties, and further that neither 
party would be entitled to object if the clinic refused to thaw or implant an embryo without 
the other’s written consent ([2018] 2 W.L.R. 1223 at [262]). The Court of Appeal approved 
this analysis. It followed that, as ARB’s signature had been forged, it did not represent valid 
written consent, and so the clinic had breached its contractual obligation.   
    Both courts rejected the clinic’s argument that the term created no more than a duty to take 
reasonable care to obtain consent. Jay J. dismissed the argument, based on Thake v Maurice 
[1986] Q.B. 644; [1986] 1 All E.R. 497, that courts rarely construe clauses of this kind as 
amounting to guarantees, since professionals do not usually undertake obligations involving 
strict liability. In that case, the success of a vasectomy could not be the subject of a binding 
contractual promise because the outcome was necessarily affected by the “vagaries of 
science”, as any reasonable person would have understood. Obtaining written consent, 
however, is a promise not contingent on other factors, and a reasonable person would 
understand such a clause to mean that written consent would, in fact, be obtained. The Court 
of Appeal concurred: there is no general rule that professionals’ obligations are always 
limited to taking reasonable care, rather their interpretation will depend on the particular 
facts. This approach is clearly correct. The courts should be slow to “read down” an 
apparently strict contractual requirement for both parents to consent to implantation of an 
embryo, given the very serious risk—a lifetime of unwilling parenthood—against which the 
term aims to protect.  
    Given these findings, the question of whether there was also a duty to take reasonable care 
to secure written consent was not essential to the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, Jay J. 
found that the clinic did owe an implied obligation to comply with its licence conditions 
and/or the terms of the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990 (as amended) ([2018] 
2 W.L.R. 1223 at [238] and [266]), which required reasonable care in obtaining written 
consent (at [246] and [162]). The Court of Appeal agreed, though it diverged on the question 
of whether or not IVF Hammersmith had breached this duty. Jay J. held that it was not in 
breach: many other clinics operated similar policies, it was not uncommon for male partners 
not to attend appointments, and the clinic was entitled to believe the forms had been filled in 
 
accurately. This was subject to one concern: that the policy was “illogical” in providing that 
“if both partners were present, their signatures should be witnessed, but if one partner was not 
present, this need not happen” even if the partner had not attended any clinic appointments 
([2018] 2 W.L.R. 1223 at [283]). In the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that, if the 
clinic’s policy was “illogical”, it could not withstand logical analysis in the way demanded by 
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] A.C. 232; [1997] 4 All E.R. 771. The 
clinic was effectively delegating the responsibility for obtaining the signature to the attending 
partner, with the result that “in precisely those circumstances where forgery was most likely, 
the safeguards for obtaining written consent were significantly reduced” ([2019] 2 W.L.R. 
1094 at [58] per Nicola Davies L.J.). Therefore, the clinic’s practice “was neither reasonable 
nor responsible” (at [59]). Given the profound implications of thrusting parenthood on 
someone without their consent, it is right, in our view, to impose the high standard of care 
envisaged, particularly in light of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; 
[2015] 1 A.C. 1430. 
    ARB therefore had a cause of action against IVF Hammersmith. The final issue was 
whether the policy objections raised against tortious claims for wrongful conception might 
apply also to:  
       “contractual claims founded on strict obligations in circumstances where the parties have  
       not sought to quantify or liquidate the damages payable in the event of breach” ([2018] 2  
       W.L.R. 1223 at [317]).  
Jay J. (at [293]) found the reasoning and conclusions of the judges in McFarlane v Tayside 
Health Board [2000] 2 A.C. 59; [1999] 4 All E.R. 961 to be tied specifically to the tort of 
negligence, since the majority there were concerned with whether it was fair and just to 
impose a duty of care on a doctor, a concern irrelevant where a strict obligation derives from 
an express contractual term. While the ratio in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 A.C. 309 was also limited to tort claims, he nonetheless felt 
that the legal policy underpinning it could apply to a contractual claim if there was 
“equivalence or congruence” between it and a hypothetical tort claim (at [305]).  In this case, 
both courts agreed that the measure of damages should mirror that available in tort. Absent a 
liquidated damages clause, the clinic’s obligation was “a secondary obligation arising by 
implication of the common law” (see [2019] 2 W.L.R. 1094 at [36]), and that common law 
 
included the legal policy that applied in McFarlane and Rees to prevent the recoverability of 
damages, due to (see [2018] 2 W.L.R. 1223 at [319]): 
(i) the moral discomfort at regarding a child as a financial liability; 
(ii) the impossibility of calculating that financial liability given the benefits and burdens 
of bringing up a healthy child;  
(iii) the refusal to offset the benefits that accrue from parenthood against additional 
financial liabilities (and moral concerns about the unacceptability of doing so); and 
(iv) that it is not fair, just and reasonable to allow this sort of claim. 
Both considered that most of these objections applied to strict contractual obligations as 
much as in tort, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of judgments in McFarlane 
concerned whether it would be “fair, just and reasonable” to impose a duty of care on doctors 
in respect of the parents’ economic loss, which ought to be irrelevant where, as in ARB, the 
duty is not being imposed on the parties by law, but is a strict and express term of a contract 
voluntarily agreed between them. Some judgments are particularly difficult to apply to ARB. 
For example, Lord Steyn in McFarlane opposed liability on the grounds of distributive 
justice: it was not fair, just and reasonable for NHS funds to pay for the costs of raising a 
healthy child. Clearly this is not in and of itself persuasive where, as here, the defendant is a 
private clinic.  
    More broadly, this approach assumes that tort and contract are normatively so similar that 
legal policy can simply be transposed across. The very purpose of contracts is to let the 
parties allocate risk and assign a value to performance. The legal policy identified is based 
partly on the view that the birth of a child cannot be considered detrimental in law, with Lord 
Millett stating in McFarlane that:  
       “if the law regards an event as beneficial, plaintiffs cannot make it a matter for  
       compensation merely by saying that it is an event they did not want to happen” ([2000] 2  
       A.C. 59 at 112).  
Yet this is precisely what contract law permits parties to do—agree the value of outcomes, 
albeit within legal limits, including public policy concerns. The courts will refuse to enforce, 
for example, where a liquidated damages clause amounts to a penalty, or where a contract 
promotes an immoral purpose, but these limits are considered exceptional, with the dominant 
principle being pacta sunt servanda—contracts should be enforced. The contract empowered 
ARB to regard it as wrong if IVF Hammersmith implanted one of his embryos without his 
 
written consent. Lord Slynn even contemplated using contract in this way in McFarlane, 
noting that “if a client wants to be able to recover such costs he or she must do so by an 
appropriate contract” (at 76). There is nothing to suggest that he meant here only contracts 
containing a liquidated damages clause. ARB was free to include one, defining the loss in the 
event of breach. As this would not fall under any of the established public policy grounds 
speaking against enforcement, it would be difficult to justify setting it aside.  
    While the damages sought in this case were extortionate, this could have been moderated 
by the ordinary remoteness rules encapsulated in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341; 156 
E.R. 145. Despite Nicola Davies L.J. conceding that “the tests of causation and foreseeability 
[were] met” and so the losses were “within the reasonable contemplation of the parties” 
([2019] 2 W.L.R. 1094 at [35]), arguably the cost of a gap year, a car, and a generous 
wedding, may all be challenged as being a different “type” of loss from “necessaries” such as 
food and clothing. Clinics are also free to impose limits on the damages payable in the event 
of breach.  
    The Court of Appeal also took the view that it would be fundamentally unfair if NHS 
patients (who can claim only in tort) could not recover damages in such situations, but those 
who had contracted for IVF services could. But where someone opts to pay for a service, 
giving something up in order to gain certain benefits under a contract, it is hard to see why 
they should be denied a remedy in the event that the other party fails to fulfil their 
undertaking. It is entirely justifiable to treat parties who have contracted differently, because 
they bargained to secure themselves rights which another has not. This is even more clearly 
so if a liquidated damages clause has been included. Therefore, even if the legal policy were 
apt for tort, it is not for contract.  
    Even were this not the case, Lord Millett’s pronouncement in McFarlane that the birth of a 
child should not be considered detrimental by the law misconceives what the damage in 
actions of this kind is. As Kirby J. rightly pointed in CES v Superclinics (1995) 38 
N.S.W.L.R. 47 at [75] (decided prior to McFarlane): 
       “[I]t was not the child as revealed which was unwanted. Nor is the child’s existence the  
       damage in the action. The birth of the child is simply the occasion by which the  
       negligence of the respondents manifests itself in the economic injury to the parents. It is  
       the economic damage which is the principal unwanted element.”  
Even ARB, who manifestly did not want a child with his former partner, claimed only for the 
financial losses sustained and not for any “lost amenity” due to her birth—a distinct head of 
 
loss which is, as discussed below, dealt with separately in contract law. That he, and other 
similarly positioned claimants, may come to love their child does not alter the fact that they 
did not choose to incur the financial implications of having a child. Further, even if one 
accepts Lord Millett’s point that having a child is an objectively good thing, whether intended 
or not, the chances of a happy outcome for parents and child will be increased by removing a 
source of stress—the financial burden—that might otherwise exacerbate an already difficult 
situation. It should also not be forgotten, though it is often downplayed in the cases, that the 
claimants are in this position and incurring this loss, in consequence of someone else’s 
wrong: in ARB, consent procedures that were manifestly unsatisfactory.  
    The second point underpinning the legal policy is that, even if we can countenance that a 
child is a detriment financially, children bring such benefits that it is impossible to 
disentangle these from the detriments they bring. As Lord Millett put it in McFarlane, “the 
advantages and disadvantages of parenthood are inextricably bound together”, and so just as 
“[n]ature herself does not permit parents to enjoy the advantages and dispense with the 
disadvantages”, nor must the law ([2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 114). This is hard to sustain in light of 
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] Q.B. 266; [2001] 3 
All E.R. 97, in which the Court of Appeal demonstrably regarded themselves as able to 
“disentangle” the benefits of a disabled child from the costs involved in raising one. 
    Some of the McFarlane and Rees judgments include a variation of this point, approved in 
ARB, that even if a wrongfully-conceived child is in some sense a harm, any compensation 
for that harm would have to be reduced by the amount of benefit the parents derive from his 
or her birth. The account would, as Lord Scott explained in Rees, be “incomplete without 
anything to represent the value of what was being acquired by the expenditure” ([2004] 1 
A.C. 309 at [138]). Yet as Lord Clyde asserted in McFarlane, the law does not conduct such 
set-off calculations in other contexts, remarking ([2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 103) that 
       “the loss sustained by a mineworker who is rendered no longer fit for work underground  
       [is not] offset by the pleasure and benefit he may enjoy in the open air of a public park.”  
 
Lord McCluskey and Lord Cullen took similar views in the Scottish Court of Session in 
McFarlane, as did Lord Toulson in Lee v Taunton & Somerset NHS [2001] 1 F.L.R. 419. 
While the other judges in both McFarlane and Rees did not share Lord Clyde’s perspective, 
no authority was cited for either of the two positions. Some detailed exploration of Lord 
Clyde’s view by the Supreme Court would therefore be welcome: of whether such a set-off 
 
should be undertaken, and if so, how the courts should undertake it. Even if Lord Clyde is 
wrong, it is not legitimate simply to assume that the benefits are so great or so 
incommensurable as to outweigh the detriments and to conclude that no compensation can be 
made.  
    This is especially so given that, in previous contractual claims for wrongful conception 
(none of them referred to in ARB), including Thake v Maurice [1986] Q.B. 644 and Sciuriaga 
v Powell (1979) 123 S.J. 406, the courts have, when determining quantum, kept different 
heads of damage (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) distinct. They have not, so to speak, 
subtracted apples from pears, by reducing pecuniary damages by the value of any non-
pecuniary damages. Instead, they have balanced out the damages under each head of loss, 
with non-pecuniary losses–pain, suffering and lost amenity–dealt with separately. The House 
of Lords in McFarlane and in Rees should similarly have kept these heads of damage distinct 
(as they generally are in questions of damages in contract and tort) rather than eliding them, 
with any offsetting of the non-pecuniary joys brought by children coming under the head of 
loss of amenity. In reality, the parents in McFarlane, Rees and ARB were not claiming for 
lost amenity (only the pecuniary losses suffered), so this would have been unnecessary. 
However doing so would have had the added benefit of more accurately reflecting the 
claimants actual complaint—the financial burden, not the existence of the child per se—and 
avoided the need even to consider the offensive conclusion that an award for financial losses 
entailed regarding the child as more trouble that he or she was worth. The decision in ARB 
and the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear an appeal are disappointing. The Court of Appeal 
had an opportunity to re-evaluate this area of law, but, rather than critically appraising the 
poorly-justified decisions in McFarlane and Rees, it extended them, unquestioned, into 
contract, without sensitivity to the normative differences between contract and tort.  
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